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Abstract 
In modern, Western societies the purpose of schooling is to ensure that school-goers acquire 
knowledge of pre-existing practices, events, entities and so on. The knowledge that is learned 
is then tested to see if the learner has acquired a correct or adequate understanding of it. 
For this reason, it can be argued that schooling is organised around a representational 
epistemology: one which holds that knowledge is an accurate representation of something 
that is separate from knowledge itself. Since the object of knowledge is assumed to exist 
separately from the knowledge itself, this epistemology can also be considered 'spatial.' In 
this paper we show how ideas from complexity have challenged the 'spatial epistemology' of 
representation and we explore possibilities for an alternative 'temporal' understanding of 
knowledge in its relationship to reality. In addition to complexity, our alternative takes its 
inspiration from Deweyan 'transactional realism' and deconstruction. We suggest that 
'knowledge' and 'reality' should not be understood as separate systems which somehow have to be 
brought into alignment with each other, but that they are part of the same emerging complex 
system which is never fully 'present' in any (discrete) moment in time. This not only 
introduces the notion of time into our understanding of the relationship between knowledge 
and reality, but also points to the importance of acknowledging the role of the 
'unrepresentable' or 'incalculable'. With this understanding knowledge reaches us not as 
something we receive but as a response, which brings forth new worlds because it necessarily 
adds something (which was not present anywhere before it appeared) to what came before. 
This understanding of knowledge suggests that the acquisition of curricular content should 
not be considered an end in itself. Rather, curricular content should be used to bring forth 
that which is incalculable from the perspective of the present. The epistemology of 
emergence therefore calls for a switch in focus for curricular thinking, away from questions 
about presentation and representation and towards questions about engagement and 
response. 
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Introduction 
In modern, Western societies schooling is almost invariably organised as an epistemological 
practice. Educational institutions present knowledge about the world 'outside' and for that 
very reason they rely upon a representational epistemology. This is an epistemology which 
holds that our knowledge 'stands for' or represents a world that is separate from our 
knowledge itself. Since the object of knowledge is assumed to exist in a separate space from 
the knowledge itself, this epistemology can also be considered 'spatial.' In this paper we 
show how 'complexity theory'1 has challenged the spatial epistemology of representation 
and we explore possibilities for an alternative understanding of knowledge in its 
relationship to reality. Our alternative takes its inspiration from complexity, Deweyan 
'transactional realism' and deconstruction. With complexity we suggest that 'knowledge' and 
'the world' should not be understood as separate systems which somehow have to be brought 
into alignment with each other, but that they are part of the same evolving complex system. 
This not only introduces the notion of time into our understanding of the relationship 
between knowledge and reality, but also points to the importance of acknowledging the 
role of the unrepresentable or the 'radically non-relational.' 
We should make clear, however, that in pointing out the incompatibility between complexity 
and representational epistemology, we do not mean to suggest that we can do without 
representations in schools. All we are suggesting is that we need to review the meaning of our 
representations in the educational sphere, and hence the representational character of 
schooling. Our interest is primarily in articulating an epistemology that helps us think about 
knowledge, representation, education and the world that does not result in, or seek, 
closure. To put it differently, we are trying to articulate a different ethic or 'way of being' 
in education, that is less concerned with representing the real than it is with living it out in 
different ways. 
This is an argument more complicated than we will be able to develop in full in this 
paper. Nevertheless, we have begun to approach this task firstly by providing a very brief 
account of education as a 're/presentational' practice, in order to make it clear what we are 
arguing against. Using perspectives from complexity we then show that all representations 
of complex phenomena ultimately betray their object (see Cilliers, 1998), and in doing this 
we address the question of what sort of epistemology is required if we would drop the 
conventional understanding of knowledge as reflecting or representing a pre-given world. 
We argue that complexity itself suggests an 'emergentist' alternative to representational 
epistemology. This alternative comes close to Dewey's transactional realism (see Biesta & 
Burbules, 2003). However it seems to lead to the more radical conclusion that because 
knowing is transactional, there will always necessarily be something that cannot make its 
appearance in the domain of representation. That however we order the world, there will 
always be more ordering yet to come. That there cannot be a notion of any final order. To 
conclude the paper, we suggest that this alternative to representational epistemology—
which could be called an 'emergentist' epistemology— could lead to a different way of 
understanding educational practice since we find education (becoming educated) is no 
longer about understanding a finished universe, or even about participating in a finished 
and stable universe. It is the result, rather, of participating in the creation of an unfinished 
universe.  
 
Knowledge and Representation 
Before discussing our 'emergentist' alternative to representational epistemology, we need to 
clarify briefly what we mean by representation, since this is an extremely broad concept 
with an extensive philosophical past. We want to talk about representation in a fairly 
restricted sense. Firstly, we want to talk about this concept as something external and 
'public' (see Hacking, 1983, pp. 132-133). In this regard we are excluding internal mental 
representations or thoughts. Secondly, we are restricting the concept of representation to 
include only those forms of representation that claim to be likenesses of the things they 
represent. This is because external or public representations can include anything that can 
be examined or regarded, including art-works that aim to distort or challenge conventional 
understandings of reality. But we also want to stretch the concept a little, to include not 
only physical objects like drawings, photographs, maps, films, tape-recordings, and 
scientific or other models but also elegant theories about electrons, gravitational forces, 
language and so on. Although one could argue that there is a difference between models 
and theories, we are purposely conflating these two concepts, since both, in our under- 
standing, are representations which intend to help us understand the world as it really is. 
The purpose of both is to enable our movement towards a knowledge/ understanding of 
what the world is really like, once and for all. It is only when we use truth as a criterion to 
judge between alternative likenesses/representations (rather than, for example, 
usefulness), and when we understand truth to mean correspondence with reality, that we 
end up with an epistemology that can be called representational.  
In contrast to this representational epistemology—which could also be called a 'spatial 
epistemology' since it depends on a correspondence between knowledge and reality—we 
propose that complexity suggests a temporal epistemology which implies that the quest for 
knowledge is not in order that we may develop more accurate understandings of a finished 
reality, as it is. Rather, the quest for knowledge is about finding more and more complex 
and creative ways of interacting with our reality. Through doing this—through intervening 
in our own realities—we find out how to create more complex realities with which we can 
interact in yet more complex and creative ways. The point is that, from a complex systems 
perspective, there are no final solutions, only ongoing interactions leading to increasingly 
more complex interactions (and 'solutions'). The key issue, for us, is that this is not how 
knowledge is commonly understood in Western educational institutions.  
 
Education as a Re/Presentational Practice 
Many if not most of our Western, modern educational practices and institutions seem to 
rely upon a representational epistemology (see Biesta & Osberg, 2007). What is 
significant here is, first of all, that they rely upon an epistemology rather than, say, a 
political, ethical or relational theory, and thus configure schooling in terms of the 
transmissions and acquisition of knowledge (there are, of course, some noticeable 
exceptions, particularly in the more radical forms of progressive education). Secondly, this 
epistemology is representational in that it is assumed that what is presented in education 
stands for something else: it stands for something in the world 'out there', and therefore is a 
representation.  
One could argue that from a historical perspective educational practices were initially 
practices of presentation (see Mollenhauer, 1983). For long periods, new generations could 
learn through direct participation in existing ways of life, by mingling, competing and 
working with adults in the 'real' world (and in some cultures and settings this is still the 
way in which new generations learn). Mollenhauer argues, however, that in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century the position of children in society changed. What disappeared was 
the situation in which children were direct participants in life. What emerged instead was a 
separate sphere or educational world especially for children, where they could be educated 
for later participation in real life (this first happened for the elites and only by the end of 
the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century for the masses). Mollenhauer's 
claim is that it was only when a separate educational world was constructed, that the 
question of representation became a central educational question. After all, once we take 
children out of 'real life', but still want to prepare them for 'real life,' we need in some way 
to represent 'real life' within the confines of the world of the child. Since we obviously 
cannot get the whole world into the school, we have to select which forms of life to 
represent in the school. We must select what is valuable from what isn't, and we must then 
represent this selection in appropriate sequences and formats. It is in precisely this respect 
that we would say that the central rationale for education is in terms of a representational 
epistemology: what and how best to represent 'the world'?  
There are, however, at least two sets of arguments that, in a sense, challenge the idea of 
schooling as representation. First, there are arguments from the point of view of learning. 
The main insight—relatively old, but for some reason education needs to be reminded of it 
from time to time—is that teaching does not determine learning. What students learn may 
have a link with what teachers teach, but the two are not necessarily identical. Through 
their participation in educational practices learners learn much more and much different 
things than that which they were supposed to learn. This poses a challenge to curriculum 
makers. The argument from progressive, participatory and 'situated' learning theories is that 
the only way in which young people can learn meaningfully is if they can participate in 
'real world' practices (see, e.g. Lave & Wenger, 1991). Representational curricula, it is 
argued, are disconnected from the things they wish to represent and therefore devoid of 
any real, significant meaning. The solution is therefore to do away with the 're' and make 
educational institutions into places where the world itself is presented.  
However, against this 'presentationalist' or 'participatory' position it has been argued, 
firstly from a conservative viewpoint, that a 'decent' education is not merely about 
practical work or apprenticeship, but one in which children get access to all the great works 
of a particular cultural tradition. In this regard, even Dewey argued that schools should 
present a purified selection of the world (Dewey, 1966). Secondly, from a radical 
viewpoint, it is argued that participatory or presentational forms of learning end up in 
socialisation and adaptation and make it difficult to create critical distance and therefore 
result in one-dimensional ways of learning. In this way 'representational' and 
'presentational' pedagogies are somewhat (although not completely) opposed to each 
other—although both strategies are still the two main approaches to education, and 
perhaps becoming increasingly intertwined (see Biesta & Osberg, 2007).  
But there is another argument that challenges the idea of representation. This argument 
challenges both presentation and representation and therefore opens the possibility of 
thinking about education in a way that gets away from the intertwined 
presentation/representation approach. This argument is supported by the work of Jacques 
Derrida—in particular his critique of 'the metaphysics of presence,' more familiarly known 
as 'deconstruction'—which can be substantiated by arguments from complexity theory (see 
Cilliers, 1998). According to this line of thinking, both presentational and representational 
pedagogies rely upon the idea of a world that is simply present and can simply be 
represented. Derrida would argue that both presentation and representation are examples of 
the 'metaphysics of presence'—the idea that there is a world 'out there' that is simply 
'present' and to which all our understandings (meanings) are in relation. In contrast to this 
position, deconstruction resists being drawn into and subsumed by any relationship with 
presence. While deconstruction certainly offers some interesting perspectives on 
education (see Biesta & Egéa-Kuehne, 2001, for a general overview; and Ulmer, 1985, and 
Biesta, 2004, for a discussion about deconstruction and educational [re]presentation), we 
believe that by challenging both representation and presentation, complexity also offers a 
way out of the dilemmas in the representational approach to education.  
 
Complexity's Challenge to Representation 
Complexity's challenge to representation comes from the idea that models of complex 
systems appear not to be representations in the usual sense of the word. They cannot be 
understood to 'stand for' or depict reality as it really is. There is no isomorphism between 
the world and our descriptions of it. We would argue that this is also the case with 
scientific theories which attempt to reduce the world to a system of rules or laws. This 
challenge to representation, we believe, does not imply that we should attempt to do 
without representations, but that we need to rethink the status and the purpose of our 
representations.  
The idea that complex models are not isomorphic with the complex systems they purport 
to represent has been defended in detail by Cilliers (1998, 2001). In a nutshell, the 
argument is that since we cannot understand something complex in all its complexity (as 
humans we have limited means and limited time), models, by definition, have to reduce 
complexity. It is exactly in this reduction that we generate understanding. A model must 
necessarily be simpler than the thing modelled. Complex systems, however, are by 
definition 'incompressible': they cannot be 'reduced' without losing something (Cilliers, 
1998, pp. 7 -10). This, in fact, is the criterion that can be used to distinguish complex 
systems from those that are merely 'complicated' (a distinction that, although useful, is not 
unproblematic: see Cilliers, 2000b). Complex systems cannot be reduced, because of the 
non-linear nature of their interconnections. The information they contain is not in the 
individual elements making up the system, but distributed in their pattern of interactions. 
This means that if we leave anything out of the system (which we have to do if we want to 
make a model) we disrupt the information contained in the system. What is more, the 
elements left out have non-linear relationships with the other elements, and we cannot 
therefore predict the magnitude of the effects this will have in a deterministic way.  
This point can be expanded to general theories which aim at understanding the universe 
by reducing its processes to a system of rules or laws. Although our understanding is a 
result of a reduction (of a distributed set of relationships to a discrete set of rules), this 
reduction is by definition flawed, and therefore our understanding of complex phenomena 
is never perfect. We can have different models of the same system, but the understanding 
generated is always a function of the specific model chosen, and there is no meta-model 
that does this work for us. The choice of models is not arbitrary—some work better than 
others—but we cannot claim that they are chosen objectively. Understanding, and the 
model which generates that understanding, go hand in hand (see also Cilliers, 2000a).  
We can therefore argue that models and theories that reduce the world to a system of 
rules or laws cannot be understood as pure representations of a universe that exists 
independently, but should rather be understood as valuable but provisional and temporary 
tools by means of which we constantly re-negotiate our understanding of and being in the 
world. We use the term re-negotiate (rather than the term negotiate) because we hold that 
the process of negotiating our world does not have an end: rather, it results in the creation 
of a new and different and sometimes more complex world. In this way our negotiations are 
always already re-negotiations; they are temporary by nature.  
 Rules and Boundaries in Complex Systems 
To use models to get to the answer that our theories are not representations but re-
negotiation tools, we first have to be clear about the fact that both models and theories 
about complex systems are well framed, receive specific inputs and produce specific 
outputs, and can therefore be considered as closed systems with well- defined boundaries. 
In contrast, the natural complex systems that we are interested in modelling—such as 
language, life, economic systems, ecosystems, education, consciousness, and so on—do 
not have clearly defined boundaries. This difference has an impact on the way in which 
rules operate in these systems.  
What is of significance here is that from the fact that models of complex systems can be 
reduced to rules, it is sometimes inferred that natural complex systems can be reduced to 
rules (two examples of this kind of inference can be found in Holland, 1998 and 
Wolfram, 2002, but there are many other examples in the complexity literature). But in 
fact the only reason rules work in models is because models have well defined boundaries. 
For example, in a 'closed', non-linear system such as a cellular automaton, where all the 
initial conditions are very precisely known, and presuming the principle of causality 
holds, there is only a single trajectory which this system can follow, and the operating 
rules sharply determine this trajectory. The very same trajectory will be followed every 
time we have a particular set of initial conditions and rules. The system will produce the 
same effects time and again, and in this way we can say the output of the system can be 
accurately represented in terms of the operating rule plus the initial conditions of the 
system. Our point is that although this may be the case with closed systems (that is, our 
models and theories), the problem lies in extending such an under- standing to natural 
complex systems, which are open systems, having boundaries that are not clearly defined.  
In open systems that interact with their environment and that have interconnections which 
extend not only internally and between systems, but also across different hierarchical 
levels, complex behaviour is not so easily reduced to a system of rules. If we assume rules 
do indeed govern the behaviour of such systems, this would mean that different rules of 
operation would criss-cross in 'individual' complex systems. So the behaviour of any 
particular system is contingent on many different and overlapping sets of rules (which 
themselves are emergent products of other interacting complex systems). The problem 
therefore becomes one of how we can describe or represent or theorise a system like this in 
terms of a single or unified set of rules. The question is how we can represent the 
behaviour of the system in terms of a set of rules when its output is partially determined 
by sets of rules to which we have no access (see Cilliers, 2000b, 2001).  
This is not to say we cannot model or theorise radically contingent systems by looking 
for their rules of operation. Obviously we can and do, and often successfully, although 
within limits (e.g. the weather). But we have to acknowledge that to model or theorise 
any interconnected system we first have to cut it off from the other regularities or systems 
with which it interacts. We cannot pretend this is not the case. We need boundaries around 
our regularities before we can model or theorise them, before we can find their rules of 
operation, because rules make sense only in terms of boundaries. The point is that the 
setting of the boundary creates the condition of possibility for a rule or a law to exist. 
When a boundary is not naturally given, as is the case with natural complex systems, the 
rules that we 'discover' also cannot be understood as naturally given. Rules and 'laws' are 
not 'real' features of the systems we theorise about. Theories that attempt to reduce 
complexity to a system of rules or laws, like our models which do precisely this, therefore 
cannot be understood as pictures of reality.  
 
Representational versus Functional Correspondence 
We still, however, have to get from this idea—that models and theories that reduce 
complexity to a handful of rules are not pure 'representations of reality'—to the idea that 
they are instead provisional, helpful tools by means of which we re- negotiate our world. 
We can start with the following question: if our models of complex systems do not reflect 
reality exactly, why does their behaviour appear to correspond with the behaviour of the 
system (reality) we are modelling? There are at least two perspectives from which this 
question can be answered.  
First, we could take the traditional perspective that our model represents some real 
pattern or regularity (albeit a radically interconnected regularity) that actually exists and 
that all we have done is separate this regularity from 'reality at large.' If we look at the 
situation like this, we see that if we were to try and represent the behaviour of an isolated 
'regularity' in terms of its rules of operation, we would find that the overlapping sets of 
rules that made the regularity behave in the way it did within the larger interconnected 
system are no longer accessible to us. If we want our model to behave in the way the 
interconnected regularity behaved, we have to find not only a new set of rules, but also a 
new set of initial conditions for these rules to operate upon. And because our model has a 
boundary, such new rules and initial conditions can be found/named. However, the rules 
and initial conditions that make our isolated model behave like the interconnected 
regularity cannot be understood to be isomorphic with the rules operating in the 
interconnected regularity. The rules of our model may produce the same effect as the 
interconnected regularity, but it is a completely different set of rules and initial conditions 
that creates this effect. In other words, regularities exist, we can detect them and even find 
rules that reliably describe their behaviour, but the rules we find are pragmatic, they are not 
real things, they are not pure reflections of reality. There is no isomorphic relationship 
between the rule in the model and the rule in the real system (if such 'real' rules even exist). 
While our models may imitate or simulate the behaviour of an observed regularity (at least 
for a while), and in this way appear to correspond to reality, we must acknowledge that 
this correspondence is not representational (or isomorphic) but functional or pragmatic. 
The ability to explain carries little warrant of truth. Our models are tools, not pictures of 
reality. For exactly the same reasons, theories which attempt to represent natural complex 
systems in terms of a few rules or laws can also not be understood to reflect the 'real' world. 
Like our models, these theories are pragmatic. They are tools. However, acknowledging 
that models and theories are tools rather than representations still doesn't get us to the point 
where we can say that models and theories are tools that help us re-negotiate our world. To 
do this we need to switch perspectives.  
A different way of understanding knowledge—and here we draw on Hacking (1983)—is 
to say that we don't first 'see' the regularity and then try to describe it by means of a set of 
rules (which don't really exist) in order to understand it (which would be a rather futile 
operation, to say the least). Rather we infer the existence of a regularity from the nature of 
our interactions with our environment. For example, we can infer the existence of 
negatively charged electrons because we can do things with them. We can use them to find 
out something else.2 However, the purpose of interacting with our environment is not 
simply to discover what the real world is like, but to find ways of manipulating our 
environment, so that we can live in it and change it. It is only through experimenting with 
our environment— interacting with our world—that knowledge emerges. We 'gain 
knowledge' not from passively observing, but from actively intervening, or, as Francis 
Bacon aptly put it, by 'twist[ing] the lion's tail' (quoted in Hacking, 1983, p. 246). From this 
perspective, knowledge is not about 'the world' as such, it is not about truth; rather, it is 
about what we can do in the world, how we can change it. The former understanding leads 
us to believe that 'the phenomena revealed in the laboratory are part of God's handiwork, 
waiting to be discovered' (Hacking, 1983, p. 225), and our models/ theories are reflections 
of this world. The latter, on the other hand, suggests that any phenomena that are 'revealed' 
are secondary effects of our transactions with our environment, and our models/theories are 
placeholders that allow us to develop more complex understandings, which in turn enable 
us to re-negotiate a reality that is becoming increasingly complex as a result of our 
interventions. We can never 'catch up' with this reality, for each time we make a move in 
this direction, we create a more complex situation for ourselves. One could say 'acquiring' 
knowledge does not 'solve' problems for us: it creates problems for us to solve. This 
represents a significant shift.  
We are asked to shift from a spatial or representational understanding of knowledge to a 
temporal understanding of knowledge, where knowledge has to do with the relationship 
between our actions and their consequences. With the latter understanding there is a split in 
time rather than in space (that is, the split between mind and world) and so we could call 
this a temporal rather than a spatial epistemology (see Biesta & Burbules, 2003, for details 
about such a temporal understanding of knowledge and truth). This temporal 
understanding of knowledge meshes with the idea that our models and theories are not 
representations of the world as such, but functional or pragmatic tools which enable us to 
interact with the world in more complex ways. In other words, through experimenting with 
our world, we are led to certain realisations about it which enable us to interact with it 
differently. This in turn leads to more complex realisations about our world, which may 
replace those held previously, and so the cycle continues. Through this never ending 
process of experimenting and rethinking we are able to continuously re-negotiate our own 
theories, and thus we re-negotiate our position in the world.  
 
Complexity's Challenge to Presentation 
We have said that complexity asks us to make a shift from a spatial or re/presentational 
epistemology to a temporal epistemology. This shift, we believe, brings us to the issue of 
complexity's challenge to presentation. To make this clear we shall review the special way 
in which complexity understands temporality.  
 
Linear versus Non-Linear Understandings of Temporality 
Complexity's understanding of temporality and process contrasts with linear understandings 
which assume that processes (causal sequences of events) happen over time and so can be 
understood from particular temporal standpoints (with no temporal standpoint being 
privileged). With this understanding, time is just another variable or parameter that can 
be applied to the system from without. From a complex systems perspective, however, 
temporality is not a static variable but an operator—functioning from within, an integral 
part of the structure of the system itself. In other words, structure and process are 
inseparable. This is illustrated by the concept of emergence, where we find that first, we 
cannot talk about one set of structures being ontologically prior to and therefore simply 
'giving rise to' another hierarchical level of structures, as is the case with a linear 
understanding of process. With emergence, if the higher (or emergent) level consists of 
units of the lower level, then they exist simultaneously (Emmeche et al., 1997). Second, we 
find that emergent features constrain the space of possibilities simply by manifesting (ibid.): 
this is precisely because they exist simultaneously with lower level components. In this 
sense emergent effects must be understood as being imprinted on the lower level 
components. This sort of 'process' ensures that a complex system has an irreversible 
trajectory and, more than this, this directionality or historicity is part of the information 
contained in the very structure of the system itself. It cannot be taken out of the system 
without destroying the system, which is why structure and process are inseparable in 
complex systems. The question is, how does this 'emergentist' understanding of time/process 
affect our understanding of knowledge?  
 
A Complexity Informed Understanding of Knowledge 
Before articulating what knowledge could mean from a complex systems perspective, we 
first need to reiterate that conventional (that is, representational or spatial) understandings 
of knowledge create a divide between the mind and the world, or between the world and 
our knowledge of it. Again, we refer to it as a 'spatial' understanding because knowledge is 
assumed to be 'in the mind' while the object of this knowledge is assumed to be 'out there' in 
a different place. This understanding of knowledge, however, leaves us with the problem of 
needing some way of checking that our knowledge or representations of the world 
correspond to the real world. However, we find we can never be sure that our 
representations correspond to the real world because every test of our representations 
simply results in more representations. To attempt to argue for realism at the level of 
representation is to be locked into a world of representations.  
Dewey solves this problem by understanding knowledge and learning in terms of action 
or, more accurately, transaction (Dewey & Bentley, 1949; Biesta & Burbules, 2003). 
Although this introduces the dimension of time into our conception of knowledge, it is 
important to be precise about the temporal character of Dewey's understanding of 
knowledge. Dewey's point is not simply that learning takes time and that we learn about 
'the world' through the effects of our actions. If this were the case we could simply replace 
the idea of knowledge as a comparison between places (mind and world) with the idea of 
knowledge as a comparison between events (before and after). The key insight in Dewey's 
transactional theory of knowing is that the world that comes 'into focus' through our 
transactions is not a world that is simply 'out there' waiting to be discovered, since this 
would imply that there is an end to our knowing when the world is perfectly in focus. In 
fact transaction never stops and hence 'the world' never stops coming into focus. The 
continuing appearance of reality, in more and more complex guises, one could say, is an 
effect of our interacting in the world, not the starting point.  
This situates Dewey's perspective very much within a complex systems framework. In the 
vocabulary of complexity we could say that knowledge emerges from our transactions 
with our environment and feeds back into this same environment, such that our 
environment becomes increasingly meaningful for us. This means we cannot have 
knowledge of our environment, once and for all—it is not something we can see, 
something to look at. Rather, it is something we have to actively feel our way around and 
through, unendingly. Why unendingly? Because in acting, we create knowledge, and in 
creating knowledge, we learn to act in different ways and in acting in different ways we 
bring about new knowledge which changes our world, which causes us to act differently, 
and so on, unendingly. There is no final truth of the matter, only increasingly diverse 
ways of interacting in a world that is becoming increasingly complex.  
Although we don't have the space to develop this idea here, we believe that the way in 
which complexity understands the notion of knowledge is congruent with Dewey's 
transactional realism, and this helps put the observer back in the world as an interested 
participant rather than a disinterested observer. To put it differently: a 'complexity based' 
understanding of knowledge helps us towards an 'emergentist' epistemology in which 'the 
world' and our 'knowledge' of it are part of the same complex system (rather than being two 
separate complex systems, which we somehow need to get into alignment). But a similarity 
with Dewey's transactional realism is not the end of the story for the epistemology of 
complexity. There is a further aspect which needs unravelling, and this is complexity's 
relationship with the radically non-relational.  
 
Knowledge and the Radically Non-relational 
Dillon (2000) has suggested that both complexity and poststructuralism understand the 
world as 'radically relational', but that these two positions differ from each other in terms of 
their understanding of this 'radical relationality'. In his words:  
For complexity thinkers the anteriority of radical relationality is just that, the anteriority of 
radical relationality ... . For poststructuralists the anteriority of radical relationality is 
relationality with the radically non-relational. Here the radically non-relational is the 
utterly intractable, that which resists being drawn into and subsumed by relation, albeit 
[that] it transits all relationality as a disruptive movement that continuously prevents the 
full realisation or final closure of relationality, and thus the misfire that continuously 
precipitates new life and new meaning. There is no relational purchase to be had on the 
intractable. It resists relation. (Dillon, 2000, p. 5)  
However, in contrast to Dillon, we believe that complexity is not oblivious to the 'radically 
non-relational'. Quite the contrary: 'relationality to the radically non- relational' could be 
considered key to the logic of complex systems.3 This is evident in Prigogine (1997), who 
insists that although new order (emergence) results when a complex system explores and 
finds new ways of working with the initial conditions, and that these initial conditions are 
provided by the lower hierarchical level—and are 'causal' in this regard—the elements 
making up the lower level do not provide everything necessary for order of a particular 
kind to emerge at the higher level. In his words:  
The system 'chooses' one of the possible branches available when far from equilibrium. 
But nothing in the macroscopic equations justifies the preference for any one solution. 
(Prigogine, 1997, p. 68, italics added).  
The single actualised version—the 'solution' that is 'chosen' by the system—is always one 
among a number of plausible alternatives that happened not to occur. This means that the 
'solution' a system will finally 'settle on' is not a foregone conclusion, but always a matter of 
chance. To put this another way, the pattern (or organisation) that emerges at the higher 
level is not only a product of the system's relational past but also of 'something' that is not 
present in the system at all. The combination of the system's relational past with the totally 
intractable or unrepresentable to produce new emergent order that supervenes on lower 
levels ad infinitum ensures that the system is never in a state where it is fully actualised, is 
never fully 'present' at any point in time, because an integral part of it is that which is  not 
part of it. It therefore remains always in the process of becoming without being (see 
Osberg & Biesta, 2007, for a more detailed account). This understanding of emergence 
comes close to key insights, developed by Derrida under the label of 'deconstruction'.  
In describing the poststructuralist perspective, Dillon comments,  
for poststructuralist thinkers, not only is there more to life than meets the eye, that 'more' 
is never something that will ultimately make its appearance in the domain of 
representation. It is the intractable always already at work within but resistant to 
representation. Its presence-as-absence spoils the show for representation since it is 
always already subverting representation's productions. (Dillon, 2000, p. 15)  
We believe this is also the case for complexity. Chance is always already at work in 
complex systems, thereby spoiling the show for representation.  
 
Implications for Schooling 
In this paper we have explored issues of representation and presentation, using complexity 
theory, Deweyan transactional realism and deconstruction. We have shown how 
complexity theory challenges the idea and possibility of representation, partly through the 
idea of incompressibility and partly by showing the problem of attempting to represent 
open systems (reality) by closed systems (representations, models, theories). The upshot of 
this is not that we should no longer attempt to develop knowledge, models, or theories—
but that we shouldn't think of them as 'copies' of the world 'out there'. Rather, we should 
understand knowledge, models and theories as tools that we use in engaging with 'the 
world'. This suggests an epistemology in which time has a central role to play—a temporal 
rather than a spatial epistemology.We have pushed this argument one step further by also 
problematising the idea and possibility of 'presentation' and 'presence.' The main step here 
was to see that time is not a static variable unaffected by systems, but rather an operator in 
the system itself. By using this line of thinking, and combining it with some insight from 
Dewey and deconstructive ideas, we suggested that complex systems can only be 
understood if we acknowledge the 'presence' of something that cannot be presented, that can 
never become 'present'. Here, as we suggested, our explorations came close to key insights 
developed by Derrida under the label of 'deconstruction'. Along these lines we have tried to 
show that complexity theory not only problematises conventional—i.e. representational—
ways of thinking about knowledge in relation to reality. We have also tried to show that it 
is possible to develop an alternative 'epistemology' using key ideas from complexity. In this 
process we found it helpful to refer to the work of Dewey, whose temporal theory of 
knowledge and whose transactional ontology show a surprising affinity with ideas 
emerging from complexity theory and deconstruction. Rather, therefore, than thinking of 
knowledge as the representation of a world that is somewhere present in itself, our 
considerations suggest an 'emergentist' epistemology in which knowledge reaches us not as 
something we receive but as a response, which brings forth new worlds because it 
necessarily adds something (which was not present anywhere before it appeared) to what 
came before.  
The challenge then is to see what this alternative 'emergentist' epistemology— which we 
may no longer even want to call an epistemology—would imply for the practice of 
schooling. What would schooling actually look like if we dropped the idea that its overall 
aim is to ensure the acquisition of knowledge of an already existing reality that is fully 
present? How might such a practice of schooling actually be 'performed'? Such questions, 
according to Ulmer (1985), open a search for a 'non-magisterial' style of teaching. When 
we consider the purpose of schooling in terms of an emergentist understanding of 
knowledge and reality, we must begin to imagine schooling as a practice which makes 
possible a dynamic, self-renewing and creative engagement with 'content' or 'curriculum' by 
means of which school-goers are able to respond, and hence bring forth new worlds. With 
this conception of knowledge, the purpose of the curriculum is no longer to facilitate the 
acquisition of knowledge about reality. Acquisition is no longer the name of the game (see 
Biesta, 2006; Osberg & Biesta, forthcoming). This means questions about what to present 
in the curriculum and whether these things should be directly presented or should be 
represented (such that children may acquire knowledge of these things most efficiently or 
effectively) are no longer relevant as curricular questions. While content is important, the 
curriculum is less concerned with what content is pre- sented and how, and more with the 
idea that content is engaged with and responded to (see Biesta, 2006). Here the content 
that is engaged is not pre-given, but emerges from the educative situation itself. With this 
conception of knowledge and the world, the curriculum becomes a tool for the emergence 
of new worlds rather than a tool for stabilisation and replication (Biesta, 2006; Osberg & 
Biesta, forthcoming).  
An example of an approach which is supported by the emergentist framework that we 
have suggested in this paper can be found in Davis and Sumara's 'enactivist' or 
'complexivist' conception of teaching, which aims to 'expand the space of the possible' 
(Davis & Sumara, 1997). However, while Davis and Sumara have certainly not ignored 
epistemology in their pedagogical formulation, their theoretical framework (drawing 
strongly on recent developments in cognitive science, artificial intelligence and second 
order cybernetics) has oriented them towards a concern with private rather than with 
public knowledge. They focus primarily on questions about teaching and learning without 
questioning the (problematic) assumption that the knowledge taught and learned in schools 
stands for something more real than itself. By focussing on 'public knowledge' in this paper, 
and (i) showing that the way in which public knowledge is thought about in schools aligns 
schooling with representational epistemology; (ii) offering an alternative 'emergentist' 
epistemology; and (iii) showing how public knowledge can be understood in terms of this 
alternative epistemology, we believe we have provided a framework that could serve as a 
platform from which to launch a series of fruitful discussions between educators and 
educational researchers who are attempting to articulate an educational ethic that operates 
some distance away from the representational epistemology of schooling that continues to 
structure classroom practice in many ( Western) societies.  
 
Notes 
1. We use the popular term 'complexity theory' only for convenience. In fact ideas from complexity are too 
diverse to constitute a coherent theory.  
2. Hacking (1983, pp. 22 -23) gives the example of a super cooled niobium droplet, which, when 'sprayed' 
with electrons (there are standard emitters with which we can spray positrons and electrons) maintains an 
electric charge which can be kept going around the ball forever. This means the drop can be kept afloat in 
a magnetic field, and indeed driven back and forth by varying the field, and one can use a magnetometer 
to tell exactly where the drop is and how fast it is moving. Whatever 'electrons' are, they have real effects. 
It is from these effects that we infer their existence.  
3. The difference of opinion here is largely a result of different understandings of the notion of 'emergence,' 
which can be understood in a 'weak' or deterministic sense as explicated, e.g. by Holland (1998) or in a 
'strong,' non-deterministic, or Prigoginian sense (see Chalmers, 2006, Osberg & Biesta, 2007).  
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